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ABSTRACT
Blockchain technology has emerged as a new paradigm to build
decentralized systems which do not require a central authority. It
is most popular for enabling Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies.
However, blockchain applications span beyond Finance, and re-
cently it has been applied to decentralized governance. Blockchain-
enabled "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" (DAOs) have
emerged as a new form of collective governance, in which com-
munities may organize themselves relying on decentralized in-
frastructure. In this article, we introduce the concept of DAO and
review the main software platforms that offer DAO creation as a
service, which simplifies the use of DAOs to non-blockchain ex-
perts; namely: Aragon, DAOstack, DAOhaus and Colony. These
platforms will be compared by showing their key features. Finally,
we will review the available visualisation tools for DAOs, and we
will introduce our open-source tool to plot DAOs activity, DAO-
Analyzer. We will illustrate its potential with the case of the DAO
Genesis Alpha, which is the main DAO of the DAOstack project.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→ Empirical studies in collab-
orative and social computing; Collaborative and social com-
puting design and evaluation methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has emerged as a new paradigm to build
decentralized systems which do not require a central authority.
It has attracted international attention as the technology behind
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. However, its capabilities extend be-
yond cryptocurrencies and other financial applications. Blockchain
enables existing applications to acquire new features, and new
distributed applications to emerge [40].
The potentials of blockchain for governance are already being
studied in the literature. Relevant features include distributed tok-
enization, self-enforcement through smart contracts, decentraliza-
tion of server-less infrastructure, autonomous automation, trans-
parent processes, or codification of trust [32].
The potential of blockchain governance is expressed especially
through the so called Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
(DAOs). In plain terms, DAOs are organizations where the interac-
tion of members (humans or machines) is mediated by a blockchain
application, which is controlled by a set of rules embedded in its
source code. DAOs are said to be able to autonomously hire peo-
ple, provide services, gain money for their own aims, own smart
property, coordinate with other autonomous software, or facilitate
cooperation, to name a few [9, 45]. As an emerging paradigm, these
promises have attracted both idealistic defenders [30, 37] and those
warning of its dangers [1, 10].
Nevertheless, this is a new field that emerged very recently, and
thus still in active development and open for broader research.
Thus, it is still early to assess if it will fulfill its decentralization
promise. In this paper, we aim to provide some insights on recent
DAO development and use from the main DAO platforms: Aragon,
DAOstack, DAOhaus and Colony. Furthermore, we present a tool,
currently under development, to visualize the activity of DAOs, and
will illustrate its use with the case of Genesis Alpha.
2 BLOCKCHAIN: THE FIELD IN A NUTSHELL
Blockchain is a distributed ledger, which can be thought as a dis-
tributed append-only database with a synchronization mechanism.
Like the Internet, the public blockchain has an open infrastructure,
and it is not owned or controlled by one central authority. Generally,
the ledger is copied in each of the network nodes, and thus can be
viewed by all its users [40, 46].
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The ledger is a sequence of blocks (hence block-chain) that con-
tains a set of transactions already performed1. Each block points
to the previous block in the ledger, forming a chain. Thus, when a
user wants to add a new transaction to the ledger, the transaction
data is verified (by the so called miners). If there is consensus of
the new block validity, it is added to the chain in a decentralized
process [14, 46]. This way to validate the transactions grants the
blockchain immutability of its past records: nobody can delete and
alter the data of the block placed [17].
The first implementation of the blockchain technology was Bit-
coin, which is a "crypto-currency", i.e. decentralized digital currency
validated through cryptography [28]. After that, thousands of new
cryptocurrencies have emerged with their own features [18].
A secondwave of blockchain applications startedwith the advent
of Ethereum in 2013 [44], which provides a distributed computing
platform and a programming language, Solidity [8]. Solidity ad-
dressed several limitations of the Bitcoin’s scripting language, like
the lack of Turing-completeness [41]. This has enabled multiple
types of decentralised applications (Dapps) and the so called "smart
contracts",computational agreements between parties which may
be self-executed and self-enforced.
Those Dapps have been applied in wide-ranging fields [3, 27].
These include financial applications such as general banking ser-
vices [6], or cryptocurrency payment [4]. Other fields, like IoT, are
using blockchain as a common communication layer [5]. The use of
Dapps for community governance enables the object of this paper:
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, or simply DAOs.
3 DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATION
The use of blockchain as an infrastructure for governance has
confronted two points of view [32]. The ones who have a high
degree of techno-determinism, who embed the idea of "market" in
the made decisions or the way that an organisation has to operate,
however, they tend to ignore the complexity of social organisations
[37]. In the other side, the critical ones defend the role of traditional
central authorities. They consider central authorities necessary to
enable democratic governance [1]. These views usually advocate
regulating blockchain markets in order to reinforce the role of the
state [32]. Moreover, governance under blockchain is challenging
per se, since it is difficult to steer a decentralized community and
promote its development without sacrificing decentralisation. The
tool that has emerged to enable organizations to operate in the
blockchain are DAOs.
There is not a consensus on how to define a DAO. However
a comprehensive definition is that “a DAO is an internet-native
entity with no central management which is regulated by a set of
automatically enforceable rules on a public blockchain, and whose
goal is to take a life of its own and incentives people to achieve a
shared common mission”.2
1In cryptocurrencies, each block holds transactions, i.e. movements of cryptocurrency
between accounts. In other more general applications such as Ethereum-based apps
(and DAOs), blocks contain operations, akin to typical instructions in a computer
program, that need to be executed.
2Definition by Luis Cuende, co-founder of the Aragon DAO platform, in: https://twitter.
com/licuende/status/1263511552709267456?
Other definition states that: “A Decentralized Autonomous Or-
ganization (DAO) is an organization whose essential operations are
automated agreeing to rules and principles assigned in code with-
out human involvement. A DAO is a novel scalable, self-organizing
coordination on the blockchain, controlled by smart contracts” [35].
In short, a DAO can be defined as people with common goals that
join under a blockchain infrastructure that enforces a set of shared
rules. Typically, the members of a DAO are registered, each with a
unique address. They also have an amount of ’governance’ tokens
linked to that address, which are usually required for participation,
and may take a role in the DAO decision-making system. It is also
common that DAOs manage resources, e.g. cryptocurrencies. DAO
members may decide how to allocate them through a decision
system.
DAO activity is recorded in the blockchain and, as a result, im-
plies a cost. Validating and confirming transactions on the Ethereum
blockchain requires a certain amount of work, called gas (paid in
crypto-currency). This work is performed by blockchain miners in
order to include transactions in a block. Gas ultimately translates
into money and the amount of gas depends on the size and type
of each transaction. As a result, it is expected that DAO activity is
conditioned by this, since users are required to pay small amounts
of cryptocurrency if they want their operation to be executed.
We can consider two kinds of DAOs, those built from scratch,
and those created from a template provided by a DAO platform,
i.e. DAOs as a service. In the first type, the members are usually
developers who have specialized knowledge to create and manage
them. Both types are described below.
3.1 DAOs built from scratch
The first remarkable DAO was The DAO, launched in April 2016
by a group of programmers. It was the most successful investment
crowdfunding at that time. The DAO was a sort of hedge fund, in
which contributors could directly vote proposed projects. Investors
would exchange Ether for tokens during an Initial Coin Offering
(ICO). Then investors would vote new projects with their votes or
tokens. In June 2016, due to an error in The DAO code, an attacker
robbed a large part of its funds [39]. However, due to The DAO rep-
resenting the largest project in Ethereum at that time, the Ethereum
Foundation decided to take action. After several days of discussions,
the foundation finally decided to move forward with a hard fork3,
and returned the stolen funds to The DAO investors. However, the
concept of immutability of the ledger past records was damaged
due to the fork [26].
Despite that traumatic event, the endeavor of creating decen-
tralized organizations to operate in the blockchain persists, but
tempered with the knowledge that any DAO operates under the
logic of smart contracts, and due to the nature of the code, it is
subject of security holes and risks.
Furthermore, creating a DAO from scratch requires highly spe-
cialized knowledge about blockchain programming. As a result, this
kind of DAOs usually support blockchain-based businesses or/and
blockchain programming projects.
3A "hard fork" means the blockchain is copied in a new version with some difference
(e.g. different rules or some blocks removed). This provokes a divergence in the two
paths forward the blockchain can take. Typically, only one is considered the "valid"
path.
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An example of DAO on decentralized finance (DeFi) is Maker-
DAO,4 which began in 2015 and was released in December 2017
[23]. MakerDAO aims to “bring financial stability and transparency
to the world economy”. This community governs theMaker Protocol
(one of the largest Dapps on Ethereum), which defines the use of
the Dai token, a stable cryptocurrency that avoids financial risk
when Ethereum’s cryptocurrency value fluctuates.
Other DAOs are focused on investment, such as The LAO that
provides a legal structure to enable members to invest in blockchain-
based projects in exchange for tokenized stock or utility tokens.
The LAO is expected to limit the liability of its member in a manner
that conforms with U.S. law [21].
3.2 DAOs enabled by a platform
Several platforms have emerged in recent times to facilitate the
deployment of DAOs in the blockchain by significantly reducing the
technological knowledge required. They provide DAO infrastruc-
ture as a service. These platforms allow users with scarce knowledge
on how blockchain works to create a DAO using a template that typ-
ically can be customized. The main platforms are Aragon, DAOstack,
DAOhaus and Colony [20].
3.2.1 Aragon. Aragon5 is by far the largest DAO platform.Aragon’s
approach is to extend the use of DAOs as a free and open-source
technology to allow the creation and management of decentralised
organizations [38]. Aragon provides a static template to make your
own DAO, but it also allows you to create a customized one. Cus-
tomization is enabled through "apps" (sets of smart contracts) which
can be installed or removed fromDAOs. The function of apps widely
vary: a vault in which to store DAO’s funds, or decision-making sys-
tems, including an app which introduces the DAOstack’s decision
system [33], discussed below, in Aragon DAOs. In addition, those
apps can be used to create a template which enables the creation of
DAOs with a more specific purpose. For example, the Committee
template [7] sets a special token which is used by a small group of
members to take decisions, like accepting new members. All this
is sustained by the aragonSDK,6 which provides a wide-ranging
number of tools to allow developers to make their own apps.
The other key feature that Aragon introduces are permissions,7
which is an access control system intended to safely connect apps
and entities (users or other apps) together. Initially, the DAO creator
has the permissions to manage it, but usually, the creator transfers
those permissions to the voting app, so the DAO ismanaged through
voting. This enables more democratic decentralised governance.
3.2.2 DAOstack. Unlike Aragon, the DAOstack platform8 does not
offer many customizations. For example, they currently provide
a single decision-making system for all their DAOs. This voting
system, called Holographic Consensus, aims to solve the problems of
scaling a DAO [12]. They argue that increasing the scale of a DAO
(in terms of either members or decisions) makes it susceptible to
attacks, or to require many users to make it work. In Holographic
Consensus [13], the quorum required to approve a proposal can
4https://makerdao.com/en/
5https://aragon.org/
6https://aragon.org/blog/introducing-aragonsdk
7https://help.aragon.org/article/21-permissions
8https://alchemy.daostack.io/
be reduced from absolute majority to relative majority if some
conditions are met. The most significant condition concerns to the
predictors or stakers, who are not necessarily members from any
DAO. Those predictors can stake a special token9 to predict the
result of a proposal. If stakers are right, they are rewarded, while if
they fail, they lose their stake. Regarding the proposal, if the staked
amount reaches a specific limit, then the quorum of that proposal
will be reduced to a relative majority. As a result, stakers help DAOs
to highlight meaningful proposals and make profit if their service
is useful. In practice, this behaviour mimics a prediction market
[43].
3.2.3 DAOhaus. DAOhaus10 is a fork of Moloch DAO’s smart con-
tracts [16]. Thus in order to better understand DAOhaus, we will
first introduceMoloch.Moloch, named as an ancient God of sacrifice,
allegedly seeks to promote an infrastructure where the collective
benefit is always greater than the individualised benefit of any par-
ticular entity [36]. Molock DAOs have a voting system that tries to
minimize attacks and abuses. For each new decision, the proposer
has to pay a tribute in tokens, and some amount of influence, which
any Moloch’s member has. When the decision is finally taken, if
any participant does not agree with the result, they will able to
make rage quitting, exiting with their portion of resources. Moloch
simplifies the voting system as no minimum quorum is needed
to approve proposals. They just count cast votes, and if there are
more than 50% up-votes, the proposal passes. Moloch DAOs include
the original Moloch DAO11 that coordinates resources for issuing
development grants for Ethereum, or Metacartel, which is a DAO
that runs a grant program to incentivize and support early-stage
Dapp teams.
In August 2019, DAOhaus was created as an interface to allow
anyone to deploy a Moloch-like DAO by setting a few parame-
ters like the name, currency, tribute size, etc. These DAOs follow
the same Moloch architecture, such as the rage quitting explained
above.
3.2.4 Colony. Colony12 has been the latest DAO platform to enable
the creation of DAOs, or “colonies”, as they named them. Colony’s
DAOs are shared by people with common goals, and resources to
accomplish them, but these DAOs can be split into domains or even
sub-domains with more specific purposes [31]. Those purposes
are translated into tasks that DAO members can accomplish to
gain more influence. For example, a web company could split its
organisation into a ’front-end’ domain, or a ’back-end’ domain, and
finally, assign tasks to those domains. On the other hand, DAO
members have a reputation token and the only way to gain more
is by performing tasks13. Unlike Aragon or DAOstack, which are
vote-driven due to the use of voting systems to allocate resources,
Colony has a meritocratic system [24] because the only way to
increase the member’s influence is working for the organisation
(i.e. work-driven).
9GEN is the DAOstack token used to stake [42]
10https://daohaus.club/
11https://www.molochdao.com
12https://colony.io/
13Performing tasks can also be exchanged by non-reputational tokens like Ethereum’s
cryptocurrency, ether
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As discussed in [20], Colony tackles the problem of scalability.
First, by splitting DAOs into domains which are potentially in-
dependent, and can work without interactions across them, in a
stigmergic manner, as it happens in other online communities, e.g.
FLOSS teams [15]. Second, by avoiding to vote, all decisions are
approved by default unless someone has an objection, in which
case it is discussed and solved with voting.
Table 1 shows a summary of all DAO platforms with their main
key features, release date in the Ethereum mainnet, and the number
of DAOs14 at the date of June 5th of 2020. Aragon is by far the
biggest platform with 1459 DAOs, followed by DAOhaus with 118
and DAOstack with 22 DAOs, while in the case of Colony, which
has been released very recently, we found no information on its
current number of DAOs.
Release DAOs Key features
Aragon Oct. 2018 1459 * Modularity* Permissions
DAOstack Apr. 2019 22 * Holographic consensusimproving scalability.
DAOhaus Aug. 2019 127 * Rage quitting* Simple decision system
Colony Feb. 2020 -
* Work driven
(meritocracy)
* DAOs split into domains.
Table 1: Summary table of the DAO platforms
4 VISUALIZATION TOOLS FOR DAOS
Online communities can be analyzed with the help of visualization
tools that represent their main stats. For example, wikis have several
tools to see at a glance how they are, Wikimedia Statistics15 shows
the evolution ofWikipedia and the rest of Wikimedia Foundation
projects, but there are others, like WikiChron,16 which provides an
in-depth analysis on Mediawiki wikis, such as those from Fandom
[11, 34].
When it comes to DAOs, there are not many tools. First we
can mention My-DAO-Dashboard,17 a tool to help you manage the
DAOs you belong to. The tool supports Moloch DAO, Aragon’s
DAO, and some DAOs of DAOstack. Given an Ethereum address,
it shows transactions, token balances, and view proposals of the
DAOs associated.
In the case of Aragon, it has Apiary,18 a web page that shows
basic stats for each organization and each app. Aragon also has
Aragon Connect,19 which is an API to fetch data and has a bunch of
features. However, those APIs does not provide so far information
about users. There are also tools that provide a global view of
the Aragon ecosystem. Scout20 is a proprietary tool developed to
14Aragon data retrieved from https://apiary.1hive.org/orgs, DAOhaus data retrieved
from https://daohaus.club/stats and DAOstack retrieved from https://alchemy.daostack.
io/
15https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/all-projects
16http://wikichron.science/
17https://devpost.com/software/my-dao-dashboard
18https://apiary.1hive.org/orgs
19https://aragon.org/connect
20https://scout.cool/aragon/mainnet
support the data analytic needs for Aragon team. Scout provides a
set of plots for Aragon to display the number of active DAOs, the
number of DAOs created by template, the amount of Ether, and
other cryptocurrencies, in the Aragon DAOs.
By contrast, DAOstack has Alchemy,21 a dashboard that provides
comprehensive information about a DAO in terms of members,
funds and proposals.DAOstack also provides an openAPI to retrieve
detailed information from their DAOs.
More interestingly, Deep DAO22 is another proprietary tool re-
cently launched that aims to display analytics for membership,
proposals, and financial data to all DAO platforms. So far they pro-
vide a table to compare DAOs across platforms and different plots
to show metrics evolution and tables with the state of the DAO.
Finally, we are also developing an open-source tool to guide our
research on how DAOs operate and evolve over time. This tool is
intended to allow us to better understand cooperation in DAOs and
it is presented below.
5 DAO-ANALYZER
Our tool is called DAO-Analyzer23 and so far provides a dashboard
to visualize the evolution of DAOstack communities. We focused
on DAOstack due to the quality of its open API,24 which provides
information about DAOs, users, proposals, and decision-making
events, including votes and stakes. An overview of the DAOstack
architecture is given in the appendix A.
In DAO-Analyzer, it is possible to select a specific DAO from
DAOstack, or the view that aggregates all of them to show the stats
of the entire DAOstack platform. The purpose is to show the activ-
ity evolution, providing time series plots for token holders (users),
votes, stakes, and proposals. Those last three (vote, stake, proposal
creation) are the main actions performed in DAOstack; thus, we use
them to define activity in DAOstack . The definition of activity is
highly dependent on the purpose of the open collaboration commu-
nity. For example, edits are usually considered in wiki communities
[19] or commits in open source development [25].
Table 2 summarizes the stats available so far in DAO-Analyzer.
Every DAO member has a reputation amount, so we have denoted
them as reputation holders, and we count how many of them are
new or active (performs at least one of the main actions) each
month. The vote and stake stats count how many votes, voters,
stakes and stakers are there in a community over time. Finally,
the proposals stats show time series the number of new proposals
and its outcome (approved or rejected). Additionally, we show a
breakdown of the proposals by their outcome, and the quorum they
reached (absolute or relative majority). Stats like ’proposal outcome
by prediction’ confront the proposal result (the result of the voting
by the DAO’s members) against the result predicted for the proposal
by the stakers. Finally, we include a success rate statistic to see how
accurate predictions from stakers were and hence, how useful is
staking for each community.
21https://alchemy.daostack.io/
22http://deepdao.world
23The tool can be found at http://dao-analyzer.science/ and the source code is released
under the GPLv3 license in this GitHub repository: https://github.com/Grasia/dao-
analyzer
24https://thegraph.com/explorer/subgraph/daostack/master
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Figure 1: Caption of DAO-Analyzer displaying aggregated statistics for all DAOstack DAOs
Figure 1 shows a caption of our tool that displays some plots on
votes, stakes, and proposals. The plots show monthly time series
that aggregate the counts across all DAOstack DAOs. June 2020
has a dark blue because it was the current month on the date this
article was written. During the months that DAOstack has been
running it shows constant activity. There is no significant increase,
probably because the number of DAOs barely changes. It is worth
to mention that until very recently, it was not possible to directly
create a DAOstack DAO, and it was required to ask for it to its
administrators.
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Stats
Rep. holders * New reputation holders* Active reputation holders
Votes * Total votes option* Different voters
Stakes * Total stakes* Different stakers
Proposals
* New proposals
* Proposal outcome
* Proposal outcome by prediction
* Success rate
* Success rate by type
Table 2: Available stats in DAO-Analyzer
5.1 The case of Genesis Alpha
In this section, we are going to show the evolution of a DAO with
our tool. Data was collected on April 22th 2020, an overview of the
process followed is provided in Appendix A.
We will consider Genesis Alpha or Genesis DAO, which is the
DAOstack DAO.25 The name is a reference to Genesis Protocol, an
implementation of the holographic consensus. Genesis mission is to
promote the use of DAOs through DAOstack and to boost the use
of the GEN token as a specific tool for decentralised governance.
The interested reader can find more details about Genesis objectives
and principles described in [2].
In order to extend and to achieve their purposes, they state
that Genesis Alpha receives monthly funding of 40k USD dollars
(in cryptocurrencies) from DAOstack [2]. Due to that, they can
use those assets to fund Genesis DAO proposals which improve
or/and extends the use of DAOstack as a DAO platform. Due to
a vulnerability in its code, it was hacked, and approximately 15k
USD were drained from Genesis DAO on the 6th of February 2019.
This delayed its launch until the vulnerability was fixed [22]. The
final launch of Genesis Alpha was in April 2019, when our analysis
starts.
Figure 2: Genesis Alpha new members time series
Genesis Alpha has 266 registered users. Figure 2 shows how
users joined to Genesis Alpha over time, 141 of them joined in the
25https://alchemy.daostack.io/dao/0x294f999356ed03347c7a23bcbcf8d33fa41dc830
first month. However, the DAO still registered a regular number
of newcomers in subsequent months (a mean around 15). Since
December 2019, this number has significantly decreased, even no
new members registered in the last two months.
Figure 3: Genesis Alpha activity (new proposals + votes +
stakes) time series
Regarding the activity, Figure 3 represents its evolution, adding
the number of new proposals, votes, and stakes in each month.
Genesis Alpha has recorded a total of 3648 actions; it is important
to remark that it represents the 53% of the whole DAOstack activity.
Thus, we can state that Genesis DAO is the most active DAO in
DAOstack . Genesis DAO registered a peak of activity in October
2019, and since then, its activity has been continuously decreasing.
Figure 4: Genesis Alpha active members time series
Figure 4 shows the number of different users who performed
at least one action over time. It has a mean of 53 active users, but
again since October 2019, which is its peak of active members, that
number has decreased.
All in all, indicators show that Genesis Alpha is the most active
DAO in DAOstack . However, from November 2019, Genesis has
abruptly started a downfall on activity, having its peak just a month
before. The sudden change is explained in [29], where it is said that
DAOstack cut the funds to Genesis Alpha. This can be confirmed
by looking at the Genesis DAO address on Etherscan26. It can be
26https://etherscan.io/address/0x294f999356ed03347c7a23bcbcf8d33fa41dc830#
analytics
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seen that since November 2019 its total balance of Ether has been
strongly reduced. If funds decrease, then proposals, where members
ask for money, diminish and subsequently votes and stakes shrink.
In addition, part of the Genesis Alpha community was not aligned
with the DAOstack objectives, as it aims to be self-funded and
independent from DAOstack commercial aims [29].
Since the decline of Genesis Alpha, the more active and funded
DAO in DAOstack is dxDAO that develops DeFi protocols and prod-
ucts.27 However, the problems happened in Genesis Alpha suggest
that while DAOs are excellent tools for distribution of funds and
for the automatic implementation (on-chain) of decisions, in their
present form they may have problems for creating social cohe-
sion and ensuring accountability since “the lack of accountability
measures turns passed proposals into ‘promises’ and requires the
community to become vigilant of one another”.28
6 CONCLUSION
The last few years have seen the emergence of decentralized organi-
zations on the blockchain as a new form for running organizations
on the Internet. DAOs are novel sociotechnical systems that set
a new way for online coordination and decision-making. Most
of them so far mainly host blockchain projects or some sort of
blockchain-based businesses. However, the DAO as a service plat-
forms have eased the access to such organizations for non-technical
users and non-blockchain related organizations, and has lead to a
surge of DAOs in recent years.
Surprisingly, there is a lack of empirical research on the topic
so far. DAOs are particularly conditioned by the idiosyncrasies
of the blockchain technology, which is decentralized and server-
less, with immutable records, and where operations imply a cost.
Furthermore, despite being in their infancy, these sociotechnical
systems are already facing problems [29] that may relate to those
that affect to other sociotechnical systems and already studied in
the literature.
Thus, we believe DAOs deserve interdisciplinary research at-
tention to ascertain whether their problems are similar or not to
those from other online and offline alternatives. Furthermore, to
determine whether they provide an effective mean for running a
decentralized organization, or they only work under certain con-
ditions, for example, when voters are known and the topics are
limited in scope. We hope that this paper and the tool presented
here serve to spark scholarly interest in DAOs.
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A DAOSTACK ARCHITECTURE
In [42] is presented how is DAOstack architecture in depth. Sum-
ming up, it is composed of several stacked layers. Base layers (Infra,
and Arc) are in charge of providing and dealing with Ethereum
blockchain and its smart contracts. The next layer, ArcGraph, is
a data one, it is used to fetch and to store changes produced on
smart contracts, to do that, this layer uses The Graph, a Ethereum
protocol which allows detecting as events any change made on the
blockchain. Furthermore, ArcGraph layer is used to provide an API,
on GraphQL, enabling the access to the data already stored. Finally,
a frontend, Alchemy,29 allows showing, creating, and interacting
with DAOs.
Data from Section 5 has been gathered fromDAOstack GraphQL.30
29https://alchemy.daostack.io/
30https://thegraph.com/explorer/subgraph/daostack/master
